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ESG RISK ASSESSMENT: WHAT NVIDIA REVEALS ABOUT GOVERNANCE SCORES

Written by Michael Miller | Nov 17, 2026, 6:47:28 PM

NVIDIA and the White Whale in the Room

Most people know Moby-Dick is boring. Far fewer have read it. The verdict has been passed along so many times that it has worn down to something like "big whale book sucks," and for many people that phrase is all they know about the book. But that isn't a judgment. Someone who has read Melville can tell you which chapters drag, why the long digressions on whaling are there, and whether or when the tedium serves the story or sinks it. That reader may still find the book boring (almost invariably), but the boredom is attached to something. They can connect it to what the novel was trying to do; that connection is what an independent perspective is made of.

ESG has acquired a similar kind of reputation. Over the past two years, much of the investment world concluded that ESG was a "woke" agenda that did more harm than good, while most of the people repeating that conclusion got it secondhand. Few could say what an ESG risk assessment examines, where it falls short, or why. There are real criticisms to make (and we make some of them below), but they only come from doing the reading. Set aside the “woke” label and ESG assessment is simply a long-term view of certain risks, an admittedly out-of-favor one: for example, what the conduct of a company’s leadership will eventually cost the people who own it. Undermining communities, degrading the environment, or tolerating weak governance can work for a while, but eventually, the bill arrives, and it can be far larger than the gains that came before it. None of this should be controversial; an investor who does not worry about these risks shouldn’t be considered much of an investor at all.

The NVIDIA case

Jensen Huang resigned as CEO of NVIDIA last week and CFO Colette Kress was named interim CEO (Fortune). Coverage has focused on his personal life, including a reported relationship with Alice Huang, a former executive at Singapore-based Megaspeed who is alleged to have worked for Chinese intelligence (Al Jazeera). For investors, the personal story matters mainly because of where it leads. Megaspeed is reported to have moved at least $7.5 billion of NVIDIA chips to Chinese companies and US officials have reportedly examined it for possible export-control violations. Megaspeed denies any wrongdoing (Fortune).

The concerns were not new. Singapore opened an investigation into Megaspeed in February 2025 (ABC News) and in October 2025 The New York Times reported that the company was under investigation over suspicions it had helped Chinese customers obtain advanced NVIDIA chips. NVIDIA defended the relationship and Huang said in November 2025, “We’ve chased down every single concern” (Fortune). The Times has since reported that the Commerce Department paused its inquiry into Megaspeed after NVIDIA’s general counsel contacted the agents involved; the pause came at the Justice Department’s request and the case now sits there. NVIDIA says it contacts officials to answer questions and seek guidance (TNW).

The larger question concerns NVIDIA’s revenue and what it disclosed. NVIDIA said its business in China went to “zero” after the US trade restrictions of April 2025. In May, Culper Research, a short seller, argued that “over 20% of Nvidia’s FY 2026 compute revenues remained driven by China,” supported by illegal GPU diversion and Southeast Asian intermediaries (Culper Research). Culper also cited experts who said NVIDIA has long had the means to detect diversion, from customer due diligence to server location data. Culper’s founder, Christian LaMarco, has since said his team found similar red flags at six more Southeast Asian companies, which he did not name (MarketWatch). The allegations are unproven. If they are substantiated, they raise serious questions about what management knew and what investors were told; those questions are now being asked (The Washington Post).

A related disclosure change has also drawn attention. In its October 2025 quarterly report, NVIDIA stopped reporting Singapore as a separate revenue line; a quarter earlier, Singapore-billed revenue was $10.2 billion, or 22% of the total (Fortune). Columbia accounting professor Shiva Rajgopal called the timing “curious,” though he noted that it proves nothing on its own. Kress, now interim CEO, has been CFO throughout.

There is precedent. In 2022, NVIDIA paid $5.5 million to settle SEC charges that it failed to disclose that crypto-mining was driving a significant share of its gaming revenue growth. It neither admitted nor denied the findings (SEC). One settlement does not establish a pattern, but this is exactly the kind of history a governance assessment exists to weigh.

Chances are you have not read the Culper report. Until about a week ago, neither had most of the people now citing it. It has been public since May. FT Alphaville noted that it "has been reimagined as an obscure document of rare prophecy," when in fact it circulated widely among short sellers and journalists, few of whom promoted it because it seemed to repackage information already known (FT Alphaville). Culper is short the stock and expects it to fall, and parts of the report rest on anonymous sources. Most of it, however, is built from corporate filings and trade records, laid out without theatrics. The first two pages are enough to see the outline of the concern. The facts were available, but few people read them. Finding facts like these is what many of the managers we work with set out to do; it is within reach of anyone willing to read primary sources and consult a relatively short list of careful analysts and journalists.

Deferring to SparkNotes

This was ESG's chance to make its case and the industry largely missed it. Many of the largest ESG index funds held NVIDIA as a top position. As of July 31, 2026, it was the largest holding in Vanguard's ESG US Stock ETF (StockAnalysis). In our review, ISS gave the company a middling overall score but strong marks for corporate governance. We found no reference to the 2022 settlement or to concerns raised in public reporting. Rating firms have no access to government investigations and they should not simply repeat a short seller's claims, but a public enforcement record and a public, sourced report are available to anyone who looks. Noting that concerns had been raised is a low bar. The board’s own conduct is also hard to square with strong governance marks. In a recent commentary, Yale’s Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and his co-authors write that the board stood behind Huang as late as November 8 and reversed course only when NVIDIA’s general counsel insisted, after Huang had spent 13 months denying that his tie to a Megaspeed executive went beyond business; in their words, “Nvidia’s directors spent three decades deferring to one man and one week governing” (Fortune).

A blended score is a summary; a summary is how an unexamined reputation forms. That is why we build our manager assessment from underlying data and do not adopt a provider's score. It is also why we care more about whether a manager deliberately weighs these factors than about whether its holdings happen to screen well. That approach does not make anyone immune to missing things, but it keeps the reading in our own hands. A fund that owns NVIDIA because NVIDIA is large is in a different position from a manager that owns it after doing the reading.

A blended score is a summary; a summary is how an unexamined reputation forms.

The financing story

The habit reaches past the ratings firms. The Economist’s cover leader last week told readers to expect an AI crash, “but not necessarily a financial cataclysm” (The Economist). “Not a cataclysm” is hardly a standard for acceptable risk. Part of the reassurance rests on financing: the largest spenders are funding much of the build-out from their own cash flow and equity. That premise is hard to reconcile with the record. Goldman Sachs estimates that the five largest hyperscalers carry roughly $3.2 trillion in AI-related commitments that do not appear on their balance sheets and its credit analysts expect debt financing to “play a key role in the AI buildout” (Yahoo Finance). When respected outlets pass along the industry’s framing without testing it, the slogan becomes the record. That is how executive claims outrun the facts. In 2018, Elon Musk and Tesla each paid $20 million to settle SEC charges over his “funding secured” tweets about taking Tesla private, which the SEC alleged lacked an adequate factual basis. Neither admitted wrongdoing and Musk stepped down as chairperson (GeekWire). The claims being made about AI today are far larger.

A build-out financed with debt makes interest rates the issue that matters most, and rates are moving the wrong way. The 10-year Treasury yield has risen to around 5.15%, up from under 4% in February, and markets are weighing a possible rate increase in December (Trading Economics). Credit markets have stayed calm so far and investment-grade spreads even narrowed into October (Tiger Brokers). But a steady spread on top of a rising base rate still means costlier borrowing. Other costs are climbing too. NVIDIA has reportedly told its largest customers that prices for many AI servers will rise by more than 15% as memory costs surge (Tom’s Hardware) and local opposition blocked or delayed at least 75 US data center projects worth roughly $130 billion in the first quarter of 2026 alone (TNW). Revenue is under pressure from the other direction. Ramp’s data show businesses used about 30% more AI tokens in October but spent only about 10% more, as token prices for OpenAI and Anthropic fell almost 15% in a month (Yahoo Finance). Higher financing costs, pricier hardware, and slower construction mean the trillions of dollars of announced spending will either buy less or have to grow, while falling prices make each dollar harder to earn back. Neither outcome eases our concern about where this ends.

“Call me skeptical”

Congressional committees have asked Huang, NVIDIA’s general counsel, and Commerce officials, including Secretary Howard Lutnick, to testify, with sessions set for early December and subpoenas threatened if they decline (ABC News). Megaspeed has said it will cooperate with US investigators (NBC News). Whether federal enforcement follows is less clear. As of November 9, the Justice Department had reportedly taken over the Megaspeed case, Commerce had not added the company to its Entity List, the export blacklist that would bar US suppliers from selling to it without a license, and President Trump had said, “I haven’t heard he’s done anything wrong” (TNW).

Whatever the outcome, the episode shows who did the reading. Investors who dismissed ESG as politics were repeating a verdict they had inherited. The funds that held NVIDIA on the strength of a governance score were relying on someone else’s summary. Neither could have explained what the risk was, where it came from, or why it mattered. In Chapter 55 of Moby-Dick, after cataloguing the distorted pictures of whales that circulated in his day, Ishmael concludes that “the only mode in which you can derive even a tolerable idea of his living contour, is by going a whaling yourself” (Project Gutenberg). NVIDIA’s living contour was visible to anyone who looked: in its filings, its enforcement history, press reporting going back to 2025, and a short seller’s report that had been public since May. Any NVIDIA shareholder who still thinks none of this matters may one day wish they had taken a few minutes to understand the principles behind ESG assessment.

Whatever the outcome, the episode shows who did the reading.

This commentary reflects our views as of November 2026 and is subject to change. It is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a recommendation to buy or sell any security. References to specific companies are illustrative.