Aspirational Investing

Michael

Conventional wisdom in the financial sector suggests a compromise exists between above-market returns and impact. We aspire for more. In this series, we speak to fiduciaries at the vanguard, who refuse to compromise between these two objectives, innovatively pursuing top-quartile performance inclusive of their unique missions.  

E010 | Ted Wagenknecht

On this episode of Aspirational Investing, Kyle Marmelstein, Investment Director and Consultant at Crewcial Partners, sits down with Ted Wagenknecht, Co-Founder, Managing General Partner, and Portfolio Manager of Applied Fundamental Research (AFR), a Cambridge, Massachusetts-based boutique running concentrated portfolios of roughly ten to twenty small- and mid-cap equities.

Wagenknecht spent time at the growth-equity firm Summit Partners and nearly a decade at DDJ Capital Management before co-founding AFR in 2013 with Kevin Curran, CFA, as a spin-out of DDJ's Value Opportunities Strategy. Over the course of the conversation, Wagenknecht lays out AFR's research-first culture, the case for a small-cap resurgence, and where the firm is finding value in and around the AI infrastructure buildout.

Kyle Marmelstein, Investment Director and Consultant at Crewcial Partners | Published September, 2026

Insights

A Research Culture, Not a Trading Desk. Wagenknecht traces AFR’s founding to a desire to build a firm around his own investment philosophy rather than someone else’s, an instinct he credits in part to entrepreneurial parents. He and Curran, who met when Wagenknecht hired him as an analyst at a prior firm, call themselves “analysts,” not portfolio managers or traders, on their own tax returns.

“We are a library, and we want to do the very best work we can on names to drive edge, and that’s really our competitive advantage.”

Transparency and Role Clarity as the Antidote to Panic. Wagenknecht credits AFR’s low client turnover to two practices: staying fully transparent with LPs throughout diligence and the life of an investment, and defining each LP’s role in the portfolio up front. He said the firm has lost, in his own words, “maybe one direct LP relationship” in its entire history. “When people have questions…they call me directly…and Kevin and I will sit down with them same day.” A clearly defined role, he argued, sets expectations before performance swings occur rather than after.

Tying Position Size to Degree of Difficulty. AFR underwrites expected returns on roughly a four-year horizon, but Wagenknecht said the names with the highest expected returns aren’t always the ones the firm should size largest. "MDOT," or Management Degree of Difficulty, ties position size to both the underwritten return and how hard it will be for that company’s management to execute the specific plan the return depends on. Measured against an equal-weighted version of the same portfolio, he said the discipline has added value in all but one or two years of the strategy’s 16-year track record, and his stated goal is to bring that number to zero over the next two decades. He framed the payoff as capturing 50 to 150 basis points a year in incremental return through sizing and buy-sell discipline alone.

The Case for a Small-Cap Reversion. Wagenknecht said rolling 10- and 20-year returns since the early 1900s show small- and mid-cap equities outperforming mega-caps roughly 90% of the time, a horizon he believes perpetual institutions like endowments and foundations should weight more heavily. He attributed recent mega-cap dominance less to a change in that pattern than to psychology: FOMO (a topic Crewcial has discussed at length in its own commentaries), the pull of consensus, and a shift from quarterly institutional reporting toward near-continuous performance measurement.

“These institutions, who should have perpetual mandates, are measuring their underlying managers in three, four-year cycles.”

AI Exposure Without the Binary Bet. Rather than hyperscalers, chipmakers, or memory names, AFR looks for profitable, well-managed businesses that don’t need outside financing and have “multiple ways to win.” By Wagenknecht’s estimate, US hyperscaler capital expenditure next year could total roughly $1.7 trillion against a Russell 2000 he sized at about $3 trillion, concentrating that spending onto a disproportionately small base of “picks and shovels” providers (a label he said he “hates” even as he used it), such as fiber contractors and grid-hardening businesses. He said the demand behind those businesses, from broadband build-out programs like BEAD to rising electrification, would persist “whether AI happens or not.”

A Capital Vacuum Has Opened Up Abroad. As investors worldwide pull capital from their home markets to chase marquee US growth names (he named SpaceX alongside “the hyperscalers”), Wagenknecht said AFR has found comparable businesses overseas, in Italy, Denmark, the UK, and Germany among others, trading at a discount to larger, richly valued peers despite similar or better growth. He said the fund now holds roughly 40% of the portfolio in what he called “developed world equities,” the highest share in the firm’s history, aided by the European Union’s greater ability to enforce infrastructure policy such as cross-border grid interconnection.

Super-Cycles and “Wonderful Little Monopolies.” AFR sorts its highest-conviction ideas into companies riding decade-plus structural tailwinds ("super cycles") and smaller, durable market leaders that dominate a niche without needing to be a $200 billion company ("wonderful little monopolies"). As an example of the latter, Wagenknecht described a niche industrial supplier holding an entrenched position within a larger global manufacturing consortium, trading, in his view, at a steep discount to larger listed peers largely because of an operational setback the business has since worked through; that kind of gap, between a business’s underlying position and how the market currently prices it, is what the firm looks to exploit.

Owner-Operators as an Unscreenable Quality Signal. Asked what quality he looks for in a business that a screen can’t capture, Wagenknecht pointed to owner-operator management: founders and career executives who treat the business “as if it’s their own” and make multi-generational decisions rather than managing to the next few quarters. He cited Steven Nielsen, former CEO of Dycom Industries, and R. Jeffrey Bailly, UFP Technologies’ longtime CEO who transitioned to Executive Chairman in June 2026, as examples, and credited small-cap boards with giving management longer runways than is typical among large-cap peers.

A Word of Caution on Private Equity as a Small-Cap Substitute. Asked what institutional allocators most misunderstand about the small-cap opportunity, Wagenknecht said many have come to treat middle-market private equity as a stand-in for small- and mid-cap public stocks. He thinks that’s a mistake; private-equity valuations and leverage both run higher, and cashing out increasingly requires a public listing or a sale to a strategic buyer since private equity firms are finding it harder to sell portfolio companies to one another. He said AFR’s own portfolio companies, when they’ve weighed buying businesses currently owned by private equity, have had one consistent reaction: "never again."

Core Takeaways

  • A concentrated, research-first culture, closer to a library than a trading desk, can be a source of edge in a small- and mid-cap portfolio.
  • Transparency with LPs and clearly defined portfolio roles, agreed on up front, can help sustain long-term, aligned partnership and prevent undue client turnover.
  • Sizing positions by how hard a thesis will be for management to execute, not just by expected return, can itself be a source of added alpha.
  • Small- and mid-cap equities have historically outperformed mega-caps across most rolling 10- and 20-year periods; recent mega-cap dominance may be more a function of psychology and shortened measurement cycles than a reversal of that pattern.
  • AI infrastructure exposure doesn’t have to mean owning hyperscalers or chipmakers; profitable, self-funding "picks and shovels" businesses in fiber and electrification can offer a less binary way in.
  • Capital flowing out of non-US developed markets to chase US growth names can leave comparable overseas businesses trading at a meaningful discount to larger, richly valued peers.
  • Durable market leaders don’t need to be $200 billion companies to dominate a niche; some of the most attractive opportunities are smaller, structurally advantaged "wonderful little monopolies."
  • Owner-operator management (leaders who treat the business as their own and make multi-generational decisions) can be the clearest quality signal a screen can’t capture.
  • Middle-market private equity is not a like-for-like substitute for small- and mid-cap public equity: valuations and leverage run higher, and liquidity increasingly depends on a public listing or strategic sale as sponsor-to-sponsor deals become harder to execute.


Notes & REFERENCES
  1. Permanent capital is an investment structure without fixed timeframes, unlike traditional private equity funds, which require selling assets within set lifecycles. This flexibility allows investors to hold onto assets as long as they find it beneficial, avoiding forced sales regardless of market conditions. By removing these time constraints, permanent capital fosters more strategic, uninterrupted partnerships, focusing on long-term growth rather than the pressure of achieving short-term gains.

 

DISCLAIMER

This podcast is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial, legal, or investment advice. The opinions expressed are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of Crewcial Partners LLC. Listeners should consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. Past performance is not indicative of future results, and all investments involve risk.

 

What were some of the main successes of Crewcial Partners last year?

Summary: Most importantly, we maintained our long-term posture through an unfriendly market. Markets have a way of overreacting to events; however, our clients stayed on track and kept their public equity exposure at high levels. Our process ensured we never faced liquidity challenges or any issue that demanded we act in a short-term matter.

Lesson: A long-term bias works but requires discipline, diversification, and an understanding of expectations. Fundamentals and valuation—the price you pay for something— ultimately matters. Crises and difficult times have winners and losers. The winners are ultimately those with the strongest balance sheets, best business strategies, and the most capable manager teams; they win over the longer term because they're better than their competition.

What are your thoughts on sizing in the current environment?

Summary: It can seem contrary to human nature at times; the stuff that does well, you want to see become a bigger and bigger part of the portfolio.  However, you should be adding money to managers that have struggled but are poised to rebound, keeping in mind your longer-term return profile. Sizing is important and depends on a deep understanding of diversification and manager volatility profiles.

Lesson: Take advantage of the natural cyclicality within markets, selling at the peaks and buying the bottom is the way to long-term sustainable success. Be proactive when managers have a great year. When Crewcial has a manager that's up 100%, we ensure that we trim back 25-50% so the capital is ready to redeploy into out-of-favor managers with even stronger future prospects.

What are some of the areas that could be improved from 2023?

Summary: We are still trying to wrap our heads around the way markets are actually functioning; the gap between price and fundamental value seems as if it's become unbounded. This creates a problem of balance. If you're constructing a diversified portfolio, one of your underlying assumptions is that it will moderate volatility and some of the short-terms concerns; this should allow you to play offense when things are bad and a little defense when things are really good. But that falls apart if markets are creating high correlations that shouldn't exist between strategies. We’re still learning to better understand which conditions can and will create more of these correlation issues, so that we don't end up constructing portfolios that require truly extraordinary levels of patience to see through.

Lesson: Cultivate a better understanding of correlation among managers.  Thinking about managers based on the way they behave in different market climates is important. Prepare for various environments and build portfolios that are not going to have several seemingly distinct strategies reacting to the same market environment. Diversification is ultimately always your friend.

What are some of the insights you’ve gained from your latest year of travel?

Summary: Being back on the road has been one of the great events of 2023. It’s rewarding to physically sit down with people, whether in Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, or the United States, and really hear what they’re seeing on the ground, what they’re doing in their portfolios, and the real-world implications, because markets aren't necessarily the real world.  Being reminded how different people see the world differently is immensely important as an investor.

Lesson: Preferable options exist outside indexation; opening up to a global perspective broadens one’s ability to consider truly impactful diversification. The goal is to find differentiated thinking wherever it is.  We're not looking for investment managers, we’re looking for thoughtful, engaged people who invest.

What does history tell us for “Magnificent Seven” index funds going forward?

Summary: The index has reached a very high level of valuation concentrated in a group of unbelievably dominant companies.  However, while no one is arguing that Apple is a bad business, there is a price for everything and this price seems too high right now. From the 60s through the 00s, people felt the same about many companies that didn't prove to be very good investments. One way to illustrate this is to look at the top five in late 90s, which included Cisco, Intel, General Electric, Microsoft, and IBM. If we exclude Microsoft from the equation, these are all still pretty powerful businesses but they have not been good stocks to own. It’s the inevitable nature of impermanence. We can almost guarantee ten or 20 years from now, the current names will be around, but they probably won't be the most popular or dominant names in the market.

Lesson: Design portfolios to capture the broader economy; while well-constructed portfolios will always have allocations to bigger names, entire swaths of the economy are growing at a much faster rate than these brand-name businesses and are currently being overlooked by investors. Capture long-term opportunities today cheaply.

What is Crewcial excited about for 2024?

Summary: First, ESG, which has unfortunately become a very controversial subject. However, at the end of the day, it's a powerful risk framework; from our perspective, we need to be able to arm both our clients and our research team and consultants with better information on this subject and approach, as it’s a complicated topic.  We can't make it simple, but we can identify very specific variables at the portfolio company level to transparently consider which managers and portfolios have a higher level of risk around material environmental, social, and governance issues that affect their viability as good investments.

Second, another big change at Crewcial was our formation of an investment committee. We’re doubling down on our approach, allowing talented team members to focus on what they understand best and follow their passions as investors, but we’re now taking those passions and directing them into somewhat of a more formalized process. It's based on tracking, monitoring, and ensuring individuals get the training they need to scale and fully capture the bigger picture to find the best managers, no matter their initial backgrounds upon entering the firm, while pairing complementary skillsets to bring out the team’s full potential.

Lesson: Don’t be afraid to be different while embracing the fundamental rules of finance. Identify the full scope of everyone’s areas of strength and play off each to build a greater whole. Embrace idiosyncrasies and preferences while being open and honest with feedback and assessments. We do not treat our investment team members as analysts, rather as investors cultivating an owner’s mindset. We're trying to find ways to capitalize on differentiated perspectives to ultimately uncover the difference between market price and fundamental value; seeing things differently, and cultivating an environment in which such perspectives can range openly, is a critical element of that.

We don’t just want the usual suspects from the same handful of schools, we want to expand our collective perspective to include more women, ethnically diverse individuals, and people of all persuasions from different parts of the country or with different educational or experiential backgrounds—talented people come in all shapes and sizes. A diverse team of diverse perspectives is intended to capture the overlooked points of view necessary to uncover the next great idea.

TBD

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